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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (d); (f) (1953, as amended) wherein the Court of Appeals is granted appellate
jurisdiction over "appeals from the circuit courts" and "appeals from a court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony." The
Utah Court of Appeals also has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the Rule 26(2)(a) of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that an appeal may be taken by the
defendant from the final judgment of conviction.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented by this petition and the applicable standard of appellate review are
as follows:
(1)

Whether or not the trial court deprived the defendant, Danny C. Hardman, of

due process of law and assistance of counsel by limiting defense counsel's closing argument to
ten minutes in violation of Sections 7 and 12 of Article I of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Standard of ftftvipw The
applicable standard of review is whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in limiting
closing argument to ten minutes. State v. St. Clair, 282 P.2d 323, 331 (Utah 1955).
(2)

Whether or not the defendant, Danny C. Hardman, was deprived of a fair trial

and assistance of counsel as provided in Sections 7 and 12 of Article I of the Utah Constitution
and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, when the trial

1

court ruled on defense counsel's request for additional time for closing argument. Standard of
Review: The applicable standard of review appears to be whether or not the trial court abused
its discretion in its remarks to defense counsel regarding her objection to the ten-minute time
limitation for closing arguments. See State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916, 923 (Utah 1987).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES

Constitutional Provisions:
Section 7 , Article I of the Utah Constitution: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.
Section 12, Article I of the Utah Constitution: "In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, . . . ."
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the r i g h t . . . to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence."
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution: "Section 1. All persons
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of live, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. . . . "
Statutes, Ordinances, and Rules: None
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal arises from the conviction of the defendant, Danny C. Hardman, for
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
Section 12.24.100 of the Salt Lake City Code. On January 18, 1994 the defendant was found
guilty by a jury verdict and on March 18, 1994 the defendant was sentenced as follows: Six
months in jail and $1,000.00 in fines and surcharges. The Court suspended 178 days of the
2

jail sentence and ordered that he perform 48 hours of community service in lieu of jail. The
Court placed the defendant on probation for one year through the Alcohol Counseling and
Education Center (ACEC), ordering that he commit no further violations of the law and
complete alcohol counseling. Notice of Appeal was filed herein by the defendant on or about
April 14, 1994.
Summary Disposition which came before the Court on its own notice of consideration
was denied on July 19, 1994. Appellant's Motion for Summary Disposition based on Salt
Lake City v. Ohms, Slip Opinion 930580, was denied pursuant to an Order dated August 25,
1994. On November 29, 1994 the appeal herein was dismissed for failure by appellant to file
his brief. However, pursuant to an Order dated December 7, 1994 the Order of Dismissal was
vacated. On January 5, 1995 a Stipulation To Extend Time Within Which to File Appellee's
Brief was filed in which the parties stipulated to a fifteen (15) day extension from January 6,
1995.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellee concurs with Appellant's Statement of Facts with the following additions
and/or exceptions:
(1) Although the City's first witness, Trina Ukoh-Eke, was not aware of the
defendant's back problems, she has not noticed that he has any difficulty standing or walking
as he did on the date of the accident. Trial Transcript, p. 18.
(2) Although Arthur Chavez had seen the defendant have difficulty walking in the
past, the difficulty in his balance and speech as observed on the date of the accident was not
normal, inasmuch as he slurred his speech and staggered. Trial Transcript, pp. 33-34. Mr.
3

Chavez also testified that the defendant's demeanor that day led him to believe that he was on
something. Trial Transcript, p. 34.
(3) Barbara Jeppson, the State toxicologist, also testified that the levels of
Meprobamate and Carisoprodal in the defendant's blood were in the high range of the
acceptable therapeutic levels. Moreover, Ms. Jeppson testified that typical symptoms in
persons taking the subject drugs included drowsiness, slurred speech, imbalance, and slow
reaction times and that it is possible to see these symptoms even at the low therapeutic range.
Trial Transcript, pp. 117-118.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Point I: It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to limit closing argument by
counsel as long as such limitations are reasonable. Limiting counsel to ten minutes of closing
argument was reasonable inasmuch as (1) the testimony in the trial lasted approximately onehalf of a day, (2) the testimony of the witnesses was largely related to the defendant's physical
abilities and demeanor, (3) the fact that the defendant had taken Soma prior to driving his
vehicle on the day in question was uncontroverted, (4) the charge was a class B misdemeanor,
(5) the trial turned on one central issue as to what caused his slurred speech and lack of
balance and coordination, and (6) defense counsel was in fact able to assert his principal
arguments to the jury.
Point II: While the trial judge's remarks in connection with defense counsel's
objection to the 10-minute limit on closing argument was likely improper, the same did not
constitute reversible error undermining confidence in the verdict returned by the jury inasmuch

4

the City's evidence was largely uncontradicted, a curative instruction was given to the jury,
and the remarks were of short duration and isolated.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPOSITION OF A TEN MINUTE CLOSING
ARGUMENT ON COUNSEL DID NOT DEPRIVE THE DEFENDANT TO DUE
PROCESS OF LAW OR ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The question before the Court as to the first issue raised by the appellant is whether or

not the trial court's ten-minute limit on closing argument was prejudicial error, depriving the
defendant of his constitutional rights under both the Utah and United States constitutions.
A,

The Trial Court May Reasonably Limit Closing Arguments.

While "[t]here can be no doubt that closing argument for the defense is a basic element
of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial," such a right does not imply "that
closing arguments in a criminal case must be uncontrolled or even unrestrained." Herring v.
New York, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 2553, 2555 (1975). As held by the United States Supreme Court in
Herring v. New York:
The presiding judge must be and is given great latitude in controlling the
duration and limiting the scope of closing summations. He may limit counsel to
a reasonable time and may terminate argument when continuation would be
repetitive or redundant. He may ensure that argument does not stray unduly
from the mark, or otherwise impede the fair and orderly conduct of the trial. In
all these respects he must have broad discretion.
Id. at 2555. While acknowledging a defendant's right to closing argument, the Utah Supreme
Court has also recognized that "it is within the inherent power of the court to reasonably limit
time for arguments of counsel, even in capital cases, . . . ." State v. St. Clair, 282 P.2d 323,
331 (Utah 1955).

5

Therefore, the threshold inquiry under both the Utah and United States constitutions is
whether or not the 10-minute time limitation on closing arguments was reasonable. As noted
in Appellant's Brief, the Supreme Court in St. Clair held that what constitutes a reasonable
time limit "will depend somewhat upon the circumstances of each case[,] [including] the
number of witnesses, the amount and nature of the testimony, contradictions in the evidence,
and the complexities of the issues involved." Id (emphasis added). However, the Supreme
Court indicated that the reasonableness of the time limit will also depend on the nature of the
offense and suggested that the standard against which a time limit is judged in a capital case is
much greater than in a case involving a lesser offense, holding that "when the offense is
punishable by death, the court should be more indulgent to the end that counsel for the accused
have sufficient time to discuss fully the evidence in the light of the law as outlined by the court
in its instructions." Id.
B.

10-Minute Closing Argument In a Class B DUI Trial Is Reasonable.

Initially, it must be observed that Mr. Hardman was convicted not of a capital offense
as in St. Clair, nor even of a felony, but of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or
Drugs1, a class B misdemeanor punishable by no more than six (6) months in jail and
$1,850.00 in fines and surcharges.2 Consequently, considerable deference must be given to

*Salt Lake City Code, § 12.24.100.
2

On March 18, 1994 the defendant was sentenced to 180 days in jail, all of which was
suspended, he was placed on supervised probation for one year through the Alcohol
Counseling and Education Center (ACEC), and he was ordered to complete 48 hours of
community service in lieu of mandatory jail and pay $1,000.00 in fines and surcharges, all of
which could be converted to community service. See Docket, page 4.
6

the trial judge's determination that ten minutes was sufficient for closing summations. Given
the nature of this case, therefore, Appellant overstates the import of the holding in Adams v.
State that the cases consistently hold that closings less than thirty minutes are suspect. 585
So.2d 1092, 1094 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). As noted by a Florida court in Foster v. State,
it may very well be that restricting defense counsel's argument to less than thirty minutes in a
given case would not be an abuse of discretion; in the ordinary felony case, however, it seems
fair to state, based on the Florida cases reviewed in the court's opinion, that such a decision is
suspect....

464 So.2d 1214, 1217 (Fla. App. 3 Dist.) (emphasis added). Indeed, all the

cases cited to in Appellant's Brief involved felony charges. See Lamar v. State, 583 So.2d
771 (Fla. App. 1991) (defendant convicted of robbery and sentenced as an habitual offender to
30 years imprisonment); State v. Washington, 614 So.2d 711 (La. 1993) (defendant convicted
of three counts of cocaine distribution and sentenced to 20 years of hard labor); Adams v.
State, 585 So.2d 1092 (Fla. App. Dist.) 0; Herring v. New York, 95 S.Ct. 2550 (1975)
(defendant convicted of 3rd degree attempted robbery and sentenced to an inderminate term of
imprisonment up to 4 years); State v. St. Clair, 282 P.2d 323 (Utah 1955) (defendant
convicted of murder and sentenced to death).
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a conviction following a two-day
trial for two felony drug counts in which the district court limited closing argument to ten (10)
minutes. U.S. v. Moye, 951 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1992). In concluding the limitation did not
constitute an abuse of discretion, the Circuit Court observed as follows:
The maximum time granted counsel for argument in this case was indeed short,
probably a short limit than we would have established. But the record does not
permit us to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in placing this
7

time limitation on closing argument. As indicated above, this was a single issue
case that was tried in two days. . . . We are persuaded that the court gave
counsel adequate time to present his argument on this issue.
Id. at 63. See also State v. Galloway, 551 So.2d 701 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1989) (finding no
abuse of discretion where trial court limited closing to ten minutes in a second degree battery
case). Therefore, while another court may have granted more time, the 10-minute limit on
closing in this case, given its short duration, given the fact that the charge was only a class B
misdemeanor and the defendant was not incarcerated, and given the other factors as set forth
below, defense counsel was given adequate time to present his argument.
In applying the other factors outlined by the Supreme Court in St. Clair, the Appellant
first noted the Supreme Court's observation in St. Clair that a forty-minute closing allowed
"less than three minutes per witness for discussion of testimony" of the sixteen witnesses
called. The Appellant then contrasted that figure with this case in which the ten-minute
closing limit allowed 75 seconds per witness for discussion of testimony of the eight witnesses
called. See Brief of Appellant, p. 15. The Appellant fails to note, however, that defense
counsel was in fact granted additional time to sum up her arguments. See Trial Transcript, pp.
163-64. Moreover, defense counsel also appeared to agree to the ten-minute limit at the time
the trial judge so ordered. See Trial Transcript, p. 155.
A review of the amount and nature of the testimony elicited from the witnesses reveals
that the time alotted was in fact reasonable. The majority of the testimony came from Officer
McArthur comprising approximately forty-six (46) pages of transcript3 and focusing primarily

3

30 pages on direct or redirect and 16 pages on cross examination.
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on his observations of the defendant's physical characteristics and demeanor. See Trial
Transcript, pp. 44-64, 75-82, 84-103. This, in comparison with the testimony of the City's
remaining five witnesses, whose testimony accounted for approximately fifty-four (54) pages
of transcript. See Trial Transcript, pp. 14-43, 103-126.
Direct examination of Officer McArthur elicited testimony regarding damage to the
vehicles, the defendant's physical appearance and demeanor,4and his performance on the field
sobriety tests. Id. Defense counsel also voir dired Officer McArthur regarding the causes of
horizontal gaze nystagmus. In addition, Officer McArthur testified that the defendant denied
having taken any prescription drugs or narcotics since the previous night. Cross-examination
of the defendant focused first on the officer's known conviction rate and his training with
respect to testifying before a jury (pp. 84-90). Next, defense counsel focused on the fact that
Officer McArthur did not observe the accident or the defendant's driving pattern and that he
was not aware of the defendant's abilities or demeanor (such as speech, balance, coordination,
and the ability to follow instructions) under both normal conditions and abnornal conditions
(pp. 90-95). Defense counsel then briefly elicited testimony from the officer that the HGN
test could not determine whether the nystagmus observed in the defendant was caused by

"The defendant "had very slow, very slurred speech. Very thick-tongued speech. He
had a hard time, in my opinion, communicating to me as you and I are right now conversing."
Trial Transcript, p. 46. "When he got off the couch he almost immediately fell backward. He
was very unsteady on his feet. He was sidestepping quite a bit to regain his balance. He had
his hands out to his side. In my opinion, trying to help himself regain his balance. . . . When
he . . . [walked] over by the window sill he almost fell down and he put his left hand out and
grabbed the window sill. He started to regain his balance, push himself back up again, and as
soon as he straightened himself up again, he started to fall backwards and Officer Fowler was
behind him. Trial Transcript, p. 52.
9

alcohol or drugs or by some other cause (p. 95-96). The final portion of cross-examination
focused on the fact that the officer did not make a decision to arrest the defendant until after he
had performed all three field sobriety tests (HGN, hand-slap, and finger count) and the fact
that the officer only administered one of the three standard field sobriety tests taught and
accepted by P.O.S.T. (pp. 96-100). The testimony of Officer McArthur, therefore, focused
primarily on simple observations of the defendant as he interacted with Officer McArthur and
performed the field sobriety tests.
As noted above, the testimony of the remaining five witnesses called by the City only
accounted for a little more than half of the City's case. Officer Fowler's testimony was
limited to a total of seven pages of transcript in which he substantiated Officer McArthur's
testimony as to the defendant's slurred speech and difficulty with balance. He also testified
that the defendant appeared to attempt to throw something (which Officer McArthur indicated
appeared to be prescription bottles) in the waste basket. Trial Transcript, pp. 82, 103-107,
108-110. The testimony of Trina Ukoh-Eke (pp. 14-20), Anna Hey (21-31), and Arthur
Chavez (31-43) primarily consisted of their observations of both the accident and the
defendant's physical characteristics and demeanor after the accident. For example, Trina
Ukoh-Eke testified on direct that she observed the defendant bump into Ms. Hey's vehicle,
return to the accident location almost hitting the car again, and stagger as he walked, barely
able to stand. Trial Transcript, pp. 14-18. Anna Hey testified on direct that after she saw the
defendant leave the accident location she ran after him yelling obscenities, that he returned to
the site against an apparent one-way road, and that he staggered as he walked. Trial
Transcript, pp. 21-27. Arthur Chavez also related his observations of the defendant following
10

the accident and after Ms. Hey began yelling at the defendant, including his conclusion that the
defendant appeared to be on something in light of his slurred speech and staggering walk.
Trial Transcript, pp. 33-34. He also testified that he was aware of the defendant's back
problems, but that the manner in which he walked after the accident was nevertheless
abnormal. Trial Transcript, p. 34. He also observed that the defendant's speech was not
normal when compared to other times Mr. Chavez had heard the defendant speak. Id.
Finally, Mr. Chavez testified that when the defendant returned to the accident site, Mr.
Chavez opened the defendant's door and told him to stop the car as it was getting closer and
closer to Ms. Hey's vehicle. Trial Transcript, p. 42. Therefore, like the testimony of Officer
McArthur, the testimony of these witnesses was relatively straightforward and consisted
largely of personal observations.
Although defense counsel attempted to discredit the testimony of the City's witnesses
during cross-examination, she was only able to obtain the following information: Ms. UkohEke was tired after having just returned home from a night shift at work; Ms. Ukoh-Eke had
not spoken with the defendant prior to the date in question (but explained that she has since
heard him speak); Ms. Hey did not notice any slurred speech by the defendant (but indicated
that he never actually spoke to her); Ms. Hey admitted that she did not mention to defense
counsel in a prior conversation that her car received a scratch (explaining that she did not file
for damages); the road on which the defendant returned to the scene was not posted as oneway at the time of the accident; Mr. Chavez was only acquainted with the defendant and he
had no training with respect to determining whether someone is under the influence. Trial
Transcript, pp. 18-20, 27-30, 35-38. However, as can be seen from the elicited information,
11

defense counsel's attempts to discredit the witnesses' testimony was largely unsuccessful and
ineffective.
The City's final witness was Barbara Jeppson, the State toxicologist who analyzed the
defendant's blood sample. Although her testimony was expert in nature, the ultimate issues
still were relatively straightforward. After establishing the proper foundation for her
testimony, direct examination focused on the results of the blood analysis performed on the
defendant's blood sample. Ms. Jeppson testified that she found two drugs: Carisoprodal and
Meprobamate, commonly referred to as Soma or Rella. Trial Transcript, p. 114. Ms.
Jeppson then testified the drugs fall within a class of drugs called central nervous system
depressants, which includes alcohol. Id. at 116. She testified that the two drugs found in the
defendant fell within the upper therapeutic ranges of each drug. Ms. Jeppson explained that
the therapeutic range is the amounts of drug in the blood a person must have in order to
accomplish its purposes and yet not harm the patient. Id. at 117-18. She also testified that
typical symptoms in someone taking these drugs would include drowsiness, slurred speech,
imbalance, and slow reaction times, even when present in the low therapeutic range. Id. at
118. She further testified that the drugs typically come with cautions regarding the operation
of motor vehicles when taking the drug. Id. at 119.
During cross-examination, Ms. Jeppson testified that she could not determine whether
or not the defendant was impaired based on the blood level of the drug alone. Id. at 120-21.
She also testified that it is possible for one to build up tolerances the longer one takes the drug.
Id. at 121. Through cross and re-direct examination, it was further established that the level
as shown in the blood sample may have been lower or higher at the time of driving an hour
12

earlier. Id. at 122-23. Ms. Jeppson further testified that given the levels in the defendant's
blood, the drugs had probably been ingested several hours before the blood was drawn. Id. at
124. She further testified that the fact because Meprobamate can be a bi-product of Soma, it
may always be present in the blood if the Soma is being taken on a regular basis. Id. at 12526.
However, when Ms. Jeppson's testimony is considered in light of the defendant's
testimony in which he admitted to having taken Soma that day (and had been taking it on a
consistent basis since 1989), the jury was not left to decide complex issues but rather one
simple question: whether or not the defendant's manner of driving, physical characteristics,
and demeanor were the result of drug impairment or were the result of prior injuries.
Although Ms. Jeppson's testimony was uncontradicted that impairment cannot be determined
based on the level of Soma in the blood alone, also uncontradicted was her testimony that
Soma can cause drowsiness, slurred speech, imbalance, and slow reactions, even in the low
therapeutic range. Consequently, contrary to Appellant's argument, the jury was not in fact
faced with complex issues, but simply of deciding what caused the defendant's behavior.
Furthermore, contrary to Appellants inference in his Brief, defense counsel was in fact
given ample time to address in closing any contradictions in the evidence and did in fact do so,
e.g., arguing that his performance on the field sobriety tests and his difficulty with balance
was not the result of drug impairment, but rather of prior physical injuries. See Trial
Transcript, pp. 160-62; see also Footnotes 5-6 supra.
Finally, it should also be noted that defense counsel was in fact able to address the
issues raised by the defense during direct and cross-examination of the witnesses, and,
13

therefore, the defendant was not prejudiced thereby. In its ten-minute+ closing, defense
counsel (1) presented its overall theory of the case to the jury,5 (2) summarized the defendant's
explanation for his actions subsequent to the accident,6 (3) reiterated that the two witnessfs
conclusions based on the defendant's balance and demeanor were unfounded assumptions made
without knowledge of the defendant's physical injuries or impairments,7 (4) explained why the
defendant was unable to adequately perform the field sobriety tests and why the field sobriety
tests do not necessarily reflect impairment,8 (5) addressed the credibility of the arresting

5

Summary of Defendant's Argument: As the defendant entered the parking structure he
made a wide turn to avoid a large truck parked in the way, and as he did so, he bumped into
the back bumper of Anna Hey's vehicle, which type of accident occurs frequently in a parking
lot by people who are not under the influence of alcohol. See Trial Transcript, p. 159.
6

Summary of Defendant's Argument: The defendant believed that no damage had
occurred as a result of the accident, and, not wishing to block traffic into the parking structure,
he drove to his parking stall intending to return and notify Ms. Hey. Because Ms. Hey was
screaming at him and ordering him to return to the accident location, he returns and attempts
to park the car in such a manner as to show Ms. Hey where his car was when he bumped into
her vehicle. Trial Transcript, pp. 159-60.
7

Summary of Defendant's Argument: Mr. Chavez and Ms. Ukoh-Eke assumed that the
defendant was under the influence because he had difficulty exiting the car, he had difficulty
with his balance and moving about, he staggered some, and he had difficulty sitting down.
However, the assumption made by these two witnesses was erroneous inasmuch as they did not
take into account, or were ignorant of, the defendant's physical injuries and the pain associated
therewith, the trauma of the accident and Ms. Hey yelling at him, and the fact that you were in
an accident two months ago. See Trial Transcript, pp. 160-61.
8

Summary of Defendant's Argument: Given the circumstances, the defendant's
performance on the field sobriety tests was to be expected. Moreover, such tests are not
necessarily simple as indicated by the prosecution, but will be affected by each individual's
level of coordination and ability to follow instructions. The jurors were also requested to
attempt to perform the tests during deliberation and then place themselves in the defendant's
shoes. See Trial Transcript, pp. 161-62.
14

officer,9 (6) reminded the jury that the toxicologist could not conclude that the defendant was
impaired based on the levels of the drug in the blood sample,10 and (7) emphasized the City's
burden and requirement to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.11 See Trial Transcript,
pp. 161-64.
Therefore, having been able to argue the issues within the time prescribed, given the
fact that the trial lasted approximately one-half of a day, the case involved relatively
straightforward issues, and the charge was a class B misdemeanor in which the defendant was
not incarcerated, defense counsel had adequate time to close and the court's 10-minute limit
did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

9

Summary of Defendant's Argument: The arresting officer testified that he believes
everyone he arrests for D.U.I, is guilty, which attitude demonstrates that when he is in a
situation like that he automatically assumes that there is a problem, without taking into account
other relevant factors. Moreover, because he keeps track of his wins and losses on D.U.L
arrests, he will have improper motives to win his cases and his perceptions and memory will
be skewed to favor facts which support his case. See Trial Transcript, pp. 162-63.
10

Summary of Defendant's Argument: The toxicologist testified that based on the blood
sample and the levels of the drug screened, she could not say that the defendant was impaired.
See Trial Transcript, p. 164.
"Summary of Defendant's Argument: "If there is in fact that little voice in you that
says maybe he's not guilty, the evidence just doesn't support it beyond a reasonable doubt, that
if you feel that uncertainty, if you can't say with a moral certitude that you know that Danny
Hardman was driving under the influence then you must find him not guilty . . . ." See Trial
Transcript, p. 164.
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H.

THE TRIAL COURT'S COMMENTS IN RESPONSE TO DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S ARGUMENTS TO ALLOW MORE THAN TEN MINUTES OF
CLOSING ARGUMENT DID NOT DEPRIVE THE DEFENDANT OF A FAIR
TRIAL OR ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The question before the Court as to the second issue raised by the appellant is whether

or not the trial court's comments in response to defense counsel1 s arguments for additional
time in closing argument deprived the defendant of a fair trial and assistance of counsel.
Appellant objected to the following comments by the trial judge in response to defense
counsel's renewed objection to the time limit:
Ms. Hyde, let me explain something to you. It is not uncommon for courts and
I have been involved in cases, it is the judge1 s duty to make sure that things run
according to some type of plan. Sometimes the attorneys tend to like to hear
themselves go on and on and on. And as you've seen throughout the trial I will
curtail that where I can. That's my obligation to have a fair trial for everyone
involved so we don't have to keep listening to one attorney go on and on and
repeat the same things. When I indicated to you that you had ten minutes, I
gave her [the prosecutor] the exact same time and I'll indicate for the record
that you began speaking slowly. You did not pinpoint your high points. You
tended to drove on slowly. If you were concerned about the rights and getting
everything in at that point I had indicated to you that you had ten minutes to
make those arguments. Having practiced myself and being told by a judge in a
homicide case that I had 20 minutes to do, go over two weeks of file, let me tell
you, I got it together and that's what you need to do and that's, those are the
rules. That's how I have to operate.
Although this question probably raises the issue of whether or not the defendant was denied his
right to be represented by counsel rather than ineffective assistance of counsel as characterized
by Appellant, the standard of review is nevertheless the same. The Appellant must show that
the judge's comments actually prejudiced the jury such that if not for the comments, a
reasonable probability existed that the outcome would have been different. Strickland v.
Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984). Accordingly, unless the comments are such as to
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undermine the confidence in the verdict, reversal is not warranted. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d
913, 920 (Utah 1987); Strickland v. Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984).
Although it cannot be contested that the judge's comments were improper, this isolated
statement cannot be shown to have so prejudiced the jury as to undermine the court's
confidence in the verdict. As noted by the Illinois appellate court in People v. Young,
[T]he remarks were made while ruling on objections made by the State during
defense counsel's cross-examination of witnesses. A court's method of ruling
upon an objection may indicate an opinion as to the validity of a party's
position; however, the context of the judge's remark must be considered in
determining whether any prejudice resulted.
618 N.E.2d 1026 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1993) (trial court indicated that defense counsel was failing
to offer proper proof and evidence). In this case, the court was ruling on defense counsel's
objection for not granting additional time, after having already ruled once before on her
request for more time. See Trial Transcript, pp. 163-64, 167. Moreover, at no time did
defense counsel request a side bar.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Morales considered a challenge in
which the district court commented that [t]he lawyers want 40 minutes apiece [and] [i]t is too
hot to listen to hot air in this hot air so we'll recess until the morning and hopefully it will cool
down by then. 868 F.2d 1562, 1576 (11th Cir. 1989). In concluding that the remarks did
not constitute prejudicial error, the court referred to the following three factors which weighed
in favor of a finding that a trial judge's comments did not constitute reversible error: '(1) the
comments occupied but a few seconds of a lengthy trial; (2) the comments were directed to
defense counsel rather than to the jury; and (3) the Trial Judge advised the jury to disregard
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any intimation by the Court relating to the facts of the case.' Id. (quoting United States v.
Preston, 608 F.2d 626, 636 (5th Cir. 1979), cert, denied 446 U.S. 940 (1980)).
In reviewing the case at bar, the inappropriate remarks were brief in duration
(comprising less than one page of transcript), the trial judge made no other improper remarks
to defense counsel during the trial, the remarks were directed to defense counsel and not the
jury, and the remarks were initially general in nature ("Sometimes the attorneys tend to like to
hear themselves go on and on and on. And as you've seen throughout the trial I will curtail
that where I can. That's my obligation to have a fair trial for everyone involved so we don't
have to keep listening to one attorney go on and on and repeat the same things."). Perhaps
most significantly, the trial court cured any error it may have created upon giving the
following instruction at the end of closing arguments:
If during this trial the court has said or done anything which has
suggested to you that it is inclined to favor the claims or position of either
party, you will not permit yourselves to be influenced by any such suggestion.
The court has not intended to indicate any opinion as to which witnesses
are or are not worthy of belief, nor which party should prevail. If any
expression has seemed to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters,
you should disregard it, because you are the exclusive judges of the facts.
See Jury Instructions on file with the Court; also copy set forth in Appendix A.
Moreover, given the nature of the comments and the evidence in favor of the City, it is
difficult to conceive how the trial judge's remarks could undermine confidence in the jury's
verdict. As set forth above, the City presented the eyewitness accounts of three witnesses who
testified that the defendant was operating the car erratically and that he almost struck Ms.
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Hey's vehicle a second time when he returned to the accident location.12 Two witnesses each
testified also that the defendant's speech was slurred and that he was very unsteady on his feet,
13

which was confirmed by both officers who appeared on the scene. See Footnote 4, supra;

Trial Transcript, pp. 103-07, 108-10. The defendant himself confirmed that his balance was
poor that day and that he dragged his left foot, explaining that he was in a lot of pain on the
day of the accident. Trial Transcript, pp. 130-31. The defendant also confirmed that he "had
a hard time getting the words out," explaining that he speaks in that manner when he becomes
angry as he did on that day. Trial Transcript, pp. 137-38. The defendant's son also testified
that his father staggered when his injuries were bothering him as on the day of the accident.
Trial Transcript, pp. 146-47. Moreover, the State toxicologist's testimony that Soma
byproducts were present in his blood was uncontradicted and even confirmed by the defendant.
Trial Transcript, p. 129. In addition, also uncontradicted was the State toxicologist's

12

Ukoh-Eke: ". . . as he come around again she was screaming at him to stop before he
hit it again. * * * From upstairs it looked like he hit it, you know, but as he was stopping it
was jerking, you know, and as they, when he did stop the car they took his keys and the
maintenance guy walked him home." Trial Transcript, p. 17. Hey: " . . . and he came within
inches of hitting my car again . . . ." Trial Transcript, p. 24. Chavez: "He started driving
toward Anna's car like he couldn't control the car." Trial Transcript, p. 33.
13

Chavez:"He couldn't walk. I had to help him. * * * Prosecutor: "Was the speech that
you heard and what you have described as slurred, did it seem normal with the speech you
normally associate with Mr. Hardman?" Chavez: "No." Prosecutor: "In what way did it
seem different?" Chavez: "It was slurred like he was just on something." Trial Transcript,
pp. 33-34.
Prosecutor: "Was his walk on this occasion what you would normally associate with
Mr. Hardman?" Hey: "No. Not at all." Prosecutor: "How did it differ?" Hey: He was, I
wouldn't even call it walking. He was staggering." Trial Transcript, p.27.
Ukoh-Eke: "[He] was staggering about, he could barely stand up by himself." Trial
Transcript, p. 18.
19

conclusion that the drug level in the defendant was in the high therapeutic range for Soma.
And finally, the State toxicologist's testimony that Soma could cause drowsiness, slurred
speech, and unsteady balance was also uncontradicted.
Therefore, given the foregoing evidence, the circumstances surrounding the objection,
and the curative instruction given after closing arguments from both parties, the inappropriate
comments were not so prejudicial as to undermine confidence in the verdict, and, as a result,
do not constitute reversible error.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the appellee, Salt Lake City, respectfully requests that the Court of
Appeals affirm the trial courtfs decision.
Dated this

day of January, 1995

MfrefSSGmy
^
Associate City Prosecutor
Attorney for Appellee
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APPENDIX

INSTRUCTION NO.

If during this trial the court has said or done anything
which has suggested to you that it is inclined to favor the
claims or position of either party, you will jiot permit
yourselves to be influenced by any such suggestion. „ _ _
The court has not intended to indicate any opinion as to
which witnesses are or are not worthy* of belief, nor which
party should prevail.

If any expression has seemed to indicate

an opinion relating to any of these matters# you should
disregard it# because you are the exclusive judges of the facts.
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